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Abstract  
 On April 24
th
, 2013 Rana Plaza, an eight story garment factory in Bangladesh collapsed 
killing one thousand one hundred and twenty nine workers and injuring many more. To date, the 
collapse of Rana Plaza is the worst industrial accident to take place in Bangladesh’s ready-made 
garment sector. Factory collapses and factory fires are not an uncommon occurrence within the 
country’s growing industry; the last decade alone has seen a number of fatalities and injuries to 
garment workers.  
 Man-made/technological disasters are the result of human error, negligence, or failure of 
a human-made system which causes damage to property and the environment as well as injuries 
and/or loss of life.  Yet environmental disasters are caused by more than one factor. They are the 
result of many events and interactions over a period of time. Therefore, in order to fully 
understand what caused a disaster such as the collapse of Rana Plaza the broader context of the 
disaster requires examination.  
 In recognizing the importance of the broader context of a disaster, this major research 
paper aims to investigate the causes of the collapse of Rana Plaza.  Using a sociological lens and 
primary and secondary documents this paper examines the political, economic, social, and 
corporate contexts which created the conditions for the collapse. This paper highlights 
weaknesses in the political, economic, corporate, and social structures involved and in doing so 
will provide recommendations for changes to remedy discrepancies that allow disasters to occur 
within Bangladesh’s ready-made garment industry. Ideally learning from this disaster will help 
in preventing similar disasters from occurring; something garment industry workers in 
Bangladesh need and deserve.   
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Foreword 
This major research paper is the final submission to the Master in Environmental Studies 
program at York University. It is the culmination of two years to studying man-
made/technological and natural environmental disasters and the political, economic, and social 
contexts from which they emerge. My plan of study and my major research paper are closely 
related, both aim to examine the incubation periods of environmental disasters.  In keeping with 
my plan of study my major research paper aims to examine the case study of the collapse of 
Rana Plaza. The social, political, and economic contexts in which the collapse took place are 
examined. My major research paper navigates the relationship between Bangladesh’s economy 
and political and social climates and its growing ready-made garment industry. My major 
research paper also examines social vulnerability in the incubation period of Rana Plaza. 
Internationally, the collapse of Rana Plaza highlighted not only the debate over corporate social 
responsibility but also shed light on the conditions under which workers are manufacturing 
garments for Western and European corporations and consumers. Recommendations which 
conclude the research paper are made with the understanding that the current context is one in 
which drastic reforms would not be accepted. My major paper aims to examine the causes of 
collapse of Rana Plaza, looking within and outside Bangladesh’s borders, linking together local 
and international actors and circumstances and in doing so fulfilling the objectives of my MES 
program.  
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Introduction 
 On April 24
th
, 2013 Rana Plaza, an eight story garment factory collapsed killing over one 
thousand workers and injuring many more. To date, the collapse of Rana Plaza is the worst 
accident to take place in Bangladesh’s ready-made garment industry. Factory collapses and 
factory fires are not an uncommon occurrence within the country’s garment industry; the last 
decade alone has seen a number of fatalities and injuries to garment workers. In April of 2005 
the Spectrum garment factory collapsed after additional (illegally built) floors gave way. Sixty-
four people were killed, eighty were injured.
1
 On December 3
rd
, 2010, Eurotex experienced a 
boiler explosion which caused a fire and resulted in a stampede; two people were killed and 
sixty-two were injured.
2
 At the time of the incident the factory was producing clothing for 
Tommy Hilfiger, Zara, Gap, and Groupe Dynamite Boutique Inc.
3
 Eleven days later, a fire broke 
out at That’s It Sportswear factory. The factory supplied clothing for Abercrombie and Fitch, 
Target, Gap, and JC Penney. Twenty-nine people were killed.
4
 In November of 2012, one 
hundred and twelve workers died in a short-circuit fire at Tazreen Fashion Factory. The factory 
supplied clothing for Wal-Mart and Disney. Following the fire, Wal-Mart ended its relationship 
with the company.
5
 In January of 2013 seven people were killed in a fire at Smart Export; the 
supplier of the parent company of the Zara clothing chain. In May, a fire broke out at the Tung 
                                               
1 CBC News, “Timeline: Deadly factory accidents in Bangladesh,” CBC News, October 9, 2013, 
http://www.cbc.ca/news2/interactives/timeline-bangladesh/.   
2 Ibid.  
3 Labour Behind the Label, “Bangladesh: One year on from tragic fire more workers die,” Labour Behind the Label, 
December 15, 2011, http://www.labourbehindthelabel.org/news/ itemlist/tag/that's%20It%20Sportswear. 
4 CBC News, “Timeline: Deadly factory accidents in Bangladesh,” CBC News, October 9, 2013, 
http://www.cbc.ca/news2/interactives/timeline-bangladesh/. 
5 Ibid.  
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Hai Sweater factory killing nine people.
6
 “Reports said that the building’s electrical [system] was 
under repairs before the fire broke out.”7 The factory was in fact closed at the time of the fire; 
those killed were factory executives holding a meeting. The factory supplied clothes to a range of 
European clothing brands.
8
 Most recently, in October of 2013, the Aswad garment factory had 
ten workers killed in a fire. The factory was linked to the Hudson’s Bay Company and Loblaw.9  
Man-made disasters are not simply “isolated events or anomalous occurrences that 
happen in a vacuum.”10 “They are rather processual; in essence an emergent phenomena that 
arises from a complex interplay of a myriad biophysical and social factors or circumstances.”11  
Therefore, in order to fully understand the causes of a disaster such as a fire in or the collapse of 
a garment factory the broader context of the disaster requires examination. Furthermore, 
according to scholar Harris Ali, “the context of a disaster must be considered if one hopes to gain 
an understanding of how particular groups within a given society are especially vulnerable to a 
disaster and its effects.”12 In recognizing the importance of the broader context of a disaster, this 
major research paper aims to investigate the causes of the largest garment factory disaster to 
date: the collapse of Rana Plaza. The paper will examine the political, economic, and social 
contexts which created the conditions for the collapse utilizing Barry Turner’s theory of disaster 
incubation as well as other disaster analysis methods. Specifically this major research paper will 
examine changes in regulation within the Ready-Made Garment (RMG) industry in Bangladesh, 
the political climate and motivations at play, the role of corporate social responsibility and non-
                                               
6 CBC News, “Timeline: Deadly factory accidents in Bangladesh,” CBC News, October 9, 2013, 
http://www.cbc.ca/news2/interactives/timeline-bangladesh/. 
7 Ibid. 
8 Ibid.  
9 Ibid. 
10 Harris Ali, “Analysing Environmental Disasters,” in Understanding the Global Environment , ed. Samir Das 
Gupta (New Delhi: Pearson Press, 2009),  260. 
11Ibid. 
12Ibid.  
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state government actors, as well as the role of consumers and Bangladesh’s economy. Examining 
the political, economic, and social contexts from which the collapse of Rana Plaza emerged out 
of highlights the institutional weaknesses that allow for a disaster such as this to occur. 
Presumably, drawing attention to such weaknesses will allow for small changes to occur to 
remedy political, economic, and social discrepancies that allow for disasters within the ready-
made garment industry to take place. Ideally learning from such tragedies will help in preventing 
similar disasters from occurring in the future; something Bangladeshi garment industry workers 
desperately need.  
Defining and analysing technological environmental disasters  
 The study of disasters has been and continues to be approached by scholars through a 
sociological lens. “Most social scientists refer to actual or possible disasters (hazards) in terms of 
physical impacts of or problems caused by unplanned and socially disruptive events. Their most 
visible features are that they do physical and social harm, that they strike suddenly (or at least are 
ultimately represented as acute), and that something can be done about them either before or 
after they happen…Studying disasters or trying to do something about them, involves examining 
social structures as both cause and effect of events that threaten human populations.”13 A 
revision of scholar C.E. Fritz’s earlier (1961) definition of a disaster, “points to the mutual 
relationship between disaster and social structure. Thus, disasters are events in which societies or 
their larger subunits (i.e. communities, regions) incur physical damages and losses and/or 
disruption of their routine functioning. Both the causes and effects of these events are related to 
the social structures and processes of societies.”14  
                                               
13 Gary Kreps, Social Structure and Disaster (Cranbury, New Jersey: Associated University Presses, Inc., 1989), 32. 
14 Ibid. 
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Disasters are therefore events that “can be observed in time and space [and] have impacts 
on social units.”15 The social units enact responses that are related to physical damages and the 
disruption of the unit’s regular functioning.16  
 Defining a disaster through a sociological perspective means that in analysing a disaster it 
is important to understand that they are not caused by a single person or incident at one time. 
According to scholar Harris Ali, “A disaster is a collectivity of intersecting processes and events, 
social, environmental, cultural, political, economic, physical, technological, transpiring over 
varying lengths of time. Disasters are totalizing events.”17  
 One way to analyse a disaster is to examine the nature of the type of disaster the event is. 
This is done in terms of the type of cause, the extent of controllability, and the consequences. 
The type of causes refers to human versus natural or both. Controllability is the degree to which 
the disaster threat or its effects can be prevented and/or controlled. While the consequences 
include short term versus long term, physical versus psychological, damage to property and 
livelihood versus harm to health, direct versus indirect effects and so on.
18
  
 Another method of analysing a disaster involves using Barry Turner’s concept of 
‘disaster incubation’. Disaster incubation is “the period before disaster onset when the causal 
factors that contribute to, or precipitate, a disaster accumulate and interact in an unnoticed 
manner.”19 In most cases, disasters bring to light issues that for many years were deemed a 
normal part of a system or process. With trends of globalization, reasons for disasters like the 
                                               
15 Gary Kreps, Social Structure and Disaster (Cranbury, New Jersey: Associated University Presses, Inc., 1989), 32. 
16
 Ibid., 33. 
17 Harris Ali, “Analysing Environmental Disasters,” in Understanding the Global Environment , ed. Samir Das 
Gupta (New Delhi: Pearson Press, 2009), 246. 
18Ibid., 248. 
19 Peter Mulvihill and Harris Ali, “Disaster incubation, cumulative impacts and the urban/ex- urban/rural dynamic 
/rural dynamic.” Environmental Impact Assessment Review 27, (2007): 344.  
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collapse of Rana Plaza span across the world and normalize issues such as political corruption or 
regulatory oversight that create conditions in which disasters occur. 
 Another element of defining and analysing a disaster is that of disaster vulnerability and 
environmental justice. Environmental justice brings attention to “the unequal distribution of risk 
within a society at both the local and international levels.”20 According to Ali, the circumstances 
which put people and places at risk include- the physical dimension, the social dimension, and 
the economic dimension.
21
 The physical dimension includes infrastructure, buildings, and critical 
facilities. The social dimension includes livelihoods, vulnerable groups, local institutions, and 
poverty. Lastly, the economic dimension is related to indirect and direct financial losses.
22
 Ali 
argues that in “investigating the issue of disaster vulnerability, key questions revolve around the 
questions of how and why certain, almost always marginalized, groups within a community are 
more susceptible than other facets of society to natural and technological disasters.”23  
For the purpose of this major research paper, the collapse of Rana Plaza will be examined 
using a sociological lens. As will be established, reasons for the collapse span over time and over 
oceans; there are physical, social, and economic dimensions embedded within reasons why the 
building came down and killed and injured thousands of people.  
The Rana Plaza disaster is characterized as a technological environmental disaster.  A 
technological environmental disaster involves a predominantly human element, as contrasted to a 
natural environmental disaster which sees natural processes, such as weather systems, as the 
culprits of damage to property and/or loss of human life. According to Ali, “Technological 
                                               
20 Harris Ali, “Analysing Environmental Disasters,” in Understanding the Global Environment , ed. Samir Das 
Gupta (New Delhi: Pearson Press, 2009),  251. 
21 Ibid. 
22 Ibid.  
23Ibid. 
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disasters are human caused disasters that by definition imply a loss of control over systems we 
have created ourselves. It is [therefore] argued that technological disasters are in principle at 
least preventable.”24As this paper aims to demonstrate, the collapse of a garment factory in an 
industrial region of Dhaka, Bangladesh had an impact on not only the immediate population of 
Bangladeshi garment workers, their families, and their employers but also on a global level with 
consumers and corporations being impacted. The collapse was, arguably, preventable as will be 
demonstrated by examining the role of Bangladesh’s politics and industrial regulations as well as 
the role of consumers and retailers.  
 According to Ali, and as will be shown through the immediate events following the 
collapse, “Researchers have found that shortly after the emergency response to a technological 
disaster, a flurry of activities occurs as individuals search for those who should be held 
responsible for the disaster and the compensation that is required thereof.”25 Ali explains, “The 
type of social context in which these interactions occur has been referred to as a ‘corrosive 
community’. In a corrosive community there is a great deal of public anger and distrust 
expressed towards the precipitating human agents of the disaster- usually associated with 
corporate greed and/or government corruption (including ineptitude and bureaucratic bungling 
by officials).”26 How long the corrosive community lasts however seems to vary. Nonetheless, it 
has the ability to impact future developments within the political, economic, and social 
dimensions that created the conditions for a disaster to occur in the first place.  
 
 
                                               
24 Harris Ali, “Analysing Environmental Disasters,” in Understanding the Global Environment , ed. Samir Das 
Gupta (New Delhi: Pearson Press, 2009), 249. 
25Ibid. 
26Ibid. 
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The Rana Plaza Collapse  
On April 24
th
, 2013 Rana Plaza, an eight story garment factory located in Savar (just outside 
of Dhaka) collapsed killing one thousand one hundred and twenty-nine people and injuring over 
two thousand.
27
 The collapse has been called the “world’s worst industrial accident in almost 
three decades.”28  
The building was owned by Md Sohel Rana, a significant figure in the governing Awami 
League.
29
 Government documents released following the collapse reported that official 
permission had only been obtained for six of the eight floors of the structure. Rana had also not 
received a permit to use the building as a manufacturing complex.
30
 The two floors were 
constructed regardless of authorized approval and were done so using substandard materials. The 
building was also situated, like most recent buildings in the Dhaka region, on a former 
watercourse.
31
 Overcrowding and machine vibrations alongside illegal construction and 
manufacturing created instability and ultimately circumstances for the collapse.  
Clear evidence of trouble was reported on April 23
rd
, the day before the collapse. Large 
cracks appeared in the building and a local engineer was called in to inspect the cracks. The 
engineer declared the building vulnerable, and recommended that it be sealed off and examined 
by experts from Bangladesh’s leading technical university.32 “Employees of a branch of BRAC 
                                               
27Jim Yardley, “Grim Task of Identifying Factories’ Dead Overwhelms Bangladeshi Lab,” May 30, 2013, The New 
York Times, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/31/world/asia/bangladeshi-lab-struggles-to-identify-rana-plazas-
dead.html?pagewanted=all.  
28Mark Mackinnon and Marina Strauss, “Spinning tragedy: The true cost of a T-shirt,” October 12, 2013, The Globe 
and Mail, http://www.theglobeandmail.com/report-on- 
business/spinning-tragedy-the-true-cost-of-a-t-shirt/article14849193/?page=all.   
29 Jeremy Seabrook, “The price of ‘progress’? From Senghenydd to Savar,” Race and Class 55 no.2 (2013): 84. 
30Ibid. 
31 Ibid. 
32 Jason Motlagh and Atish Saha, “The Ghosts of Rana Plaza: In Bangladesh, one year after the worst accident in the 
history of the garment industry, recovery remains a fragile process, justice seems elusive, and reform has a long way 
to go,” Virginia Quarterly Review 90, no. 2 (2014): 66. 
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bank located inside the building were told not to report for work the next day.”33 Management of 
the garment factories however, not only reassured their workers that the building was secure, but 
in some cases threatened a stoppage of wages if they did not report to  work the next morning.
34
 
Selim Reza, a worker who survived eight hours trapped under the rubble, [said] “They beat some 
of us and told us there is nothing to worry about. Nothing will happen. It is just a simple 
crack.”35  
At 8:45 am on the day of the collapse the power in the building abruptly cut off, a common 
occurrence in the region, known to happen up to fifty times a day.
36
 According to journalist 
Jason Motlagh, “within seconds four diesel generators, stationed at the rear of the building near 
the main staircase, automatically started up, and the factory lights flickered back on. The 
generators weighed several metric tons each, and their relentless vibrations pulsed through the 
building filled with more than three thousand workers spread from end to end and across the 
weak points at its core.”37 According to a worker, as the generators vibrated, “the floor and 
pillars began to shake and a deafening clap echoed across the floor that sent throngs of workers, 
most of them women, scrambling for the stairwells.”38 The floor collapsed and sent workers 
plunging into “a mess of concrete and machinery, where everything went black.”39 The collapse 
is thought to have originated with a column near the southwest corner of the seventh floor which 
triggered a chain reaction.
40
  
                                               
33Jeremy Seabrook, “The price of ‘progress’? From Senghenydd to Savar,” Race and Class 55 no.2  (2013): 84. 
34 Ibid. 
35Shahnaz Parveen, “Rana Plaza factory collapse survivors struggle one year on,” April 23, 2014, BBC News, 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-27107860. 
36
 Jason Motlagh and Atish Saha, “The Ghosts of Rana Plaza: In Bangladesh, one year after the worst accident in the 
history of the garment industry, recovery remains a fragile process, justice seems elusive, and reform has a long way 
to go,” Virginia Quarterly Review 90, no. 2 (2014): 66. 
37 Ibid.  
38 Ibid.  
39 Ibid.  
40Ibid. 
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 Initial rescue efforts were conducted by local people who emerged as first responders 
before army soldiers arrived on scene. Rescuers dug survivors out with their bare hands and cut 
the limbs of those trapped under slabs of concrete, doing so with hacksaws and no anesthetic.
41
 
Victims were taken to the Enam Medical College and Hospital, less than a mile away from the 
collapse site,
42
 where doctors worked tirelessly to mend the hack jobs of volunteer rescuers.
43
 
The seven hundred and fifty bed facility was filled to capacity that day.
44
  
Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina declared the day after the collapse “a national day of mourning 
and ordered the arrest of Sohel Rana and the owners of the five garment factories who leased the 
building.”45 Within two days two owners and two government engineers were taken into police 
custody, Rana had fled.
46
  
As rescue and recovery efforts were underway outrage over the collapse grew in the city and 
in surrounding areas. According to Motlagh, “A 1 500 strong mob in central Dhaka threw rocks 
at the headquarters of the Bangladesh Garment Manufacturers and Exporters Association 
(BGMEA), the country’s powerful trade body, [while] another mob attacked a building where 
garment factories remained open despite the mourning day.”47 “Elsewhere in Savar and the 
garment making industrial zones of Gazipur, Ashulia, and Narayanganj, at least two factories 
were torched while scores of workers smashed vehicles and clashed with police, demanding the 
death penalty for Rana.”48  
                                               
41 Jason Motlagh and Atish Saha, “The Ghosts of Rana Plaza: In Bangladesh, one year after the worst accident in the 
history of the garment industry, recovery remains a fragile process, justice seems elusive, and reform has a long way 
to go,” Virginia Quarterly Review 90, no. 2 (2014): 68. 
42Ibid. 
43 Ibid., 72. 
44 Ibid., 68. 
45 Ibid., 70. 
46 Ibid. 
47 Ibid. 
48 Ibid.  
 
Otlewski14 
 
Although government agencies and the police knew about the cracks on April 23
rd
 and could 
have shut the building down, Rana was blamed for convincing factory managers the building 
was safe. Yet not only had government and police officials failed to shut down the facility the 
day before the collapse, the Bangladesh Fire Services and Civil Defense had signed off on 
Rana’s building and safety compliance multiple times, having given it a good rating as recently 
as April 4
th
.
49
  
Officials continued to fail workers and their families as rescue and recovery efforts were 
conducted haphazardly seeing volunteer responders hurt and in some cases killed by unstable 
falling concrete or fires that broke out.
50
 Western diplomats concluded “that Bangladeshi 
authorities were ill prepared for an urban-rescue operation of this magnitude.”51 International 
offers of help also went unanswered by Bangladeshi authorities. Hours after the collapse, for 
example, “a senior UN official in Dhaka reminded the director general of the fire brigade that the 
government was part of a network of disaster prone countries eligible for international search and 
rescue assistance. The UK followed up with an offer to dispatch an urban rescue team equipped 
with potentially lifesaving micro cameras and scanners that could detect body heat under the 
rubble.”52  
“Internal documents obtained by London’s Daily Telegraph later revealed that Bangladesh 
rejected outside help, fearing damage to national pride. The document reportedly noted ‘face 
saving’ measures suggested by foreign diplomats to help avoid offending Bangladeshi 
officials.”53 “City officials later admitted that a lack of oversight and a gross underestimation of 
                                               
49
 Jason Motlagh and Atish Saha, “The Ghosts of Rana Plaza: In Bangladesh, one year after the worst accident in the 
history of the garment industry, recovery remains a fragile process, justice seems elusive, and reform has a long way 
to go,” Virginia Quarterly Review 90, no. 2 (2014): 70. 
50 Ibid., 73. 
51 Ibid. 
52 Ibid. 
53 Ibid. 
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the scale of the disaster allowed people to make off with the wrong bodies in the days that 
followed.”54 Some instances may have been unintentional as many of the victims’ features were 
damaged beyond recognition. Furthermore, in their haste to bury bodies in accordance with 
Islamic custom, families made rash decisions. The lure of cash also may have played a role, 
since authorities were dispersing 20 000 taka payments to help cover burial costs.
55
 Rescue and 
recovery operations were called off on May 13
th
, seventeen days after the collapse.
56
 Authorities 
stated that about 2 500 people were injured in the accident and 2 437 people were rescued; 1 129 
people had been killed.
57
  
Rana Plaza contained garment factories (New Wave Bottoms Limited, Phantom Apparels 
Ltd., Phantom Tack Ltd., and Ethar Textile Ltd.), a bank, apartments, and several other shops 
that sold electronic goods, computers, perfumes, and garments.
58
 The garment factories 
manufactured clothing for brands including “Benetton; Cato Corp; The Children's Place;  Joe 
Fresh a label owned by Canadian company, Loblaw; the UK company Primark's Denim Co and 
Cedarwood State labels, Papaya Denim of UK's Matalan company, Free Style Baby sold at 
Spanish retail chain El Corte Ingles, and the Spanish work clothing label, Velilla.”59 For 
Canadians, photographs of brightly coloured Joe Fresh clothing amid the wreckage of Rana 
                                               
54 Jason Motlagh and Atish Saha, “The Ghosts of Rana Plaza: In Bangladesh, one year after the worst accident in the 
history of the garment industry, recovery remains a fragile process, justice seems elusive, and reform has a long way 
to go,” Virginia Quarterly Review 90, no. 2 (2014): 71 
55 Ibid. 
56 Ibid.,77. 
57
 BBC News, “Bangladesh factory collapse toll passes 1,000,” BBC News, May 10, 2013,  
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-22476774. 
58 BDNews24.com, “80 dead, 800 hurt in Savar high –rise collapse,” BDNews24.com. April 24, 2013, 
http://bdnews24.com/bangladesh/2013/04/24/rana-plaza-collapse-32-dead. 
59 Institute for Global Labour and Human Rights, “As Bangladesh Toll Hits 400, Calls Grow to Grant Workers the 
Same Protections as Labels They Make,” 2013, http://www.globallabourrights.org/press/as-bangladesh-toll-hits-
400-calls-grow-to-grant-workers-the-same-protections-as-labels-they-make.  
Otlewski16 
 
Plaza resonated the most.
60
 Photographs signalled not only the corporations’ involvement in the 
collapse but the consumers’ as well.  
Emerging from the disaster were stories of broken families and bleak futures. Many families 
lost loved ones who were the sole bread winners, children lost parents, husbands and wives lost 
spouses.
61
 Noman Bin Sanit Arnob aged sixteen, for example, lost his mother Shehna Akter 
Kajol who worked at Phantom Tac on the fourth floor of Rana Plaza. His father, Anamul Kabir, 
worked at New Wave Style on the seventh floor and was paralyzed from the waist down. In an 
interview with Toronto Star reporter, Raveena Aulakh, Noman said that he dreamed of becoming 
a textile engineer and attending the Bangladesh University of Engineering and Technology.
62
 “It 
was an achievable dream- his parents worked in the garment trade, knew the ins and outs and 
were earning enough to put him through college.”63 Following the collapse, the dream is no 
longer possible. “‘There is no money anymore,’ he [said]. ‘I had to take up whatever I could and 
it seems this is it.’”64 
Mossammat Rebecca Khatun lost a foot and a leg in the collapse. She also lost five family 
members, including her mother.
65
 “I spent two days under the rubble craving water. I did not 
know when it was day or when it was night. It was all the same to me under the rubble. And they 
never found my mother's body.”66 Another worker, Srabon Ahmed Jahangir was rescued within a 
few hours of the collapse. While Srabon was not physically injured, he was not able to return to 
                                               
60 Mark Mackinnon and Marina Strauss, “Spinning tragedy: The true cost of a T-shirt,” October 12, 2013, The Globe 
and Mail, http://www.theglobeandmail.com/report-on- 
business/spinning-tragedy-the-true-cost-of-a-t-shirt/article14849193/?page=all. 
61Farid Ahmed, “Dhaka building collapse: Shattered lives,” BBC News Asia, April 28, 2013, 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-22332374. 
62 Raveena Aulakh, “Rana Plaza: His dreams died in the collapse,” The Toronto Star, October 12, 2013,  
http://www.thestar.com/news/world/clothesonyourback/2013/10/12/rana_plaza_his_dreams_died_in_the_collapse.ht
ml.  
63 Ibid.   
64 Ibid. 
65 Shahnaz Parveen, “Rana Plaza factory collapse survivors struggle one year on,” April 23, 2014, BBC News, 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-27107860.   
66 Ibid. 
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the garment industry.
67
 With money donated by a non-governmental organization (NGO) he is 
trying to establish his own business, a street tea stall. His shop stands in front of his house but he 
does not have customers.
68
 He told BBC News reporter Shahnaz Parveen, “‘I have no income so I 
live with my parents. I tried other jobs but I can't seem to concentrate on anything these days. 
My father has been carrying all my expenses and my son's too.’”69 
For the weeks and months following the collapse, Western and European media focussed on 
who was responsible for allowing such unsafe working conditions. A Globe and Mail article 
highlighted the debate around how much “responsibility retailers should have for the supply 
chain that moves products onto their shelves.”70 According to journalists Mark Mackinnon and 
Marina Strauss, “As garment factories have pushed into new markets in search of ever-cheaper 
labour, the apparel industry has become perhaps the ultimate symbol of two decades of 
globalization…The manufacturing of clothing now ties together Western consumers and distant 
Asian workers in a cycle driven by trends and budgets that change with the seasons.”71 Supply 
chains are increasingly fragmented, according to the Globe and Mail.  “Production jumps from 
city to city with middlemen outsourcing to other middlemen. Governments make bold claims but 
few check on safety. The consumer knows little about the long journey of that piece of clothing 
to the store – only that it has become far more inexpensive than ever before.”72  
  Companies such as Loblaw, for example, place their orders through middlemen, who in 
turn source work to a network of far-flung factories. The retailer in many cases does not know 
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where in the world its products will be produced when an order is placed.
73
 Inspecting buildings 
and working conditions has been beyond the retailer’s scope.74 Yet the responsibility for the 
collapse does not solely rest on supply chain awareness. As this major research paper will 
explore, supply chain awareness is but a drop in the ocean when it comes to determining who 
and what is responsible for the collapse that injured and killed thousands of garment industry 
workers.  
Politics and the Economy  
 Bangladesh is a developing country in Southern Asia; it borders the Bay of Bengal, 
sitting between the countries of Burma and India. The country is 147 570 square kilometers and 
home to approximately 160 million people, with roughly seventy-five per cent of them living in 
rural areas.
75
 “In the last few decades urbanization has been rapid. In 2010, [the country’s] GDP 
was 5.8 per cent, slightly higher than the previous year. In 2008, 52.5 per cent of [Bangladesh’s] 
GDP came from the service sector, as compared to 28.5 per cent from industry and 19.0 per cent 
from agriculture.”76 The industrial sector has played an increasingly large role in the 
development of Bangladesh’s economy. In most developing countries, the industrial sector rather 
than the agricultural sector has been the driver of economic growth as countries move from low- 
to middle-income status.
77
 This is also the case in Bangladesh, where the average productivity of 
industry is higher than in agriculture.
78
 The industrial sector and as a result the wealth of 
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Bangladesh relies on a large labour force. Author Jeremy Seabrook argues, “Workers [form] part 
of a vast machine for enriching others- lawmakers of political parties, bureaucrats, factory 
owners, exporters, middle-men, importers, retailers, and international brands in the West.”79 
Yet despite the economy of Bangladesh growing at “an average rate of 6% per annum it 
remains one of the poorest countries in the world with a per capita income of only $440 a 
year.”80 The majority of people in Bangladesh have yet to benefit from the country’s economic 
growth.
81
 “Poverty is so widespread that eighty percent of the rural people are poor, defined in 
terms of caloric intake (2 100 calories) and more than half of the population is below the 
subsistence level (less than 1 800 calories) who cannot meet the basic needs of life. . .”82 “In 
absolute terms the poverty problems in Bangladesh are reported to be worsening as evidenced by 
the increase in the number of people living below the poverty line from 50 million in 1972 to 70 
million in 2005.”83  
  Bangladesh also has both an age and gender skew in its poverty.
84
 “Poverty levels in the 
country are high, even more so for women. Women generally receive less household resources 
for their food, education, health, and clothing than men do. The situation is also not helped by 
the ‘extremely patriarchal’ nature of Bangladeshi society. Opportunities for women to work are 
often restricted to ‘unpaid family labour or paid work that can be carried out in the home.’”85 
Therefore, of note is the “positive impact of employment opportunities for women in terms of 
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family planning and population control in the country.”86 “Independent working-women are 
[becoming] more conscious about the advantage of a small family, and are exposed to modern 
family planning methods. Working adolescent girls tend to avoid early marriage as they have 
their own source of income and are self-dependent. The mean age of marriage for girls working 
in [ready-made garment] factories tend to be higher than the national average.”87 
Various policies over the course of Bangladesh’s history have shaped the direction in 
which the economy has developed. According to authors Mohammad Yunus and Tatsufumi 
Yamagata, “During the post-independence period, industrial development of Bangladesh has 
been directed by several industrial policies: the Industrial Policy of 1973, the New Industrial 
Policy of 1982, the Revised Industrial Policy of 1986, and the Industrial Policy of 1999 followed 
by a number of other policies, with the latest being the Industrial Policy of 2010.”88  These 
policies have aimed to revamp the sector with the view of creating a strong manufacturing base 
in the economy.
89
 According to data from the Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics (BBS), “the 
contribution of the manufacturing sector to Bangladesh’s gross domestic product (GDP) was 
17.86 percent in 2009/2010.”90 The Industrial Policy of 2010, proposed an integrated strategy of 
economic growth through rapid industrialization.
91
 The policy envisioned “an increase in the 
industry sector’s share in GDP to forty percent by 2021, with the proportion of the workforce 
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employed in the sector rising to twenty-five percent of the country’s total labour force.” 92 With 
this push in industrialization focus on the ready-made garment industry grew. As a result, 
Bangladesh has embraced garment assembly as a form of export-led growth, relying on their 
large population of low waged workers. The fact that wages have been rising in China has also 
contributed to Bangladesh’s appeal within this sector on a global level.93 Like other Asian 
countries, Bangladesh has specifically promoted garment manufacturing as “a model of 
economic development… as the first step on the ladder of economic development.”94  
 According to scholar Ian Taplin, “Progressive trade liberalization, starting with NAFTA 
and culminating in the ending of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in 1994… 
brought to a close a period where global textile and apparel industries were heavily regulated.”95  
“The subsequent replacement of GATT by the World Trade Organization (WTO) gradually 
phased out Multi-Fibre Arrangement (MFA) quotas and lowered tariffs on such goods. This 
changing trade regime effectively made it possible for firms to manufacture textiles and apparel 
anywhere in the world where technological conditions, labour costs, infrastructure and market 
proximity were most optimal.”96 Journalist Jason Motlagh argues that, “Under the terms of the 
World Trade Organizations Agreement on Textiles and Clothing (in effect from 1995-2005) 
more industrialized countries agreed to export fewer textiles while less industrialized countries 
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saw their export quotas increase. The new regime was a boom for Bangladeshi garment makers, 
who enjoyed quota-free access to Europe and higher exports to the US and Canada.”97  
Bangladesh earns approximately $20 billion a year from garment exports. The country 
exports mainly to the United States and Europe, with $1.1 billion of those clothing exports going 
to Canada.
98
  The country has “more than 5 000 garment factories, handling orders for nearly all 
of the world’s top brands and retailers. It has become an export powerhouse largely by delivering 
lower costs, in part by having the lowest wages in the world for garment workers.”99 “Over 
seventy percent of Bangladesh’s factories are located in and around Dhaka, the capital city. The 
industry has created a large labour force, mostly women, with lower wages and severe 
regimentation.”100 “From the very beginning, unit labour cost in Bangladesh was the lowest 
compared to other RMG producing countries. During the 1990s, unit labour cost in Bangladesh  
was $0.11 ($/shirt), whereas the same was $0.26 in India, $0.43 in Pakistan and $0.79 in Sri 
Lanka. According to  the Brussels-based International Textile, Garment and Leather Worker 
Federation, in February 2005, ‘a garment worker in Bangladesh received only 6 cents as wage 
per hour, compared to 20 cents in India and Pakistan, 30 cents in China, 40 cents in Sri Lanka, 
and 78 cents in Thailand.’”101 
Scholar Jeremy Seabrook argues that, “Garments are woven… into the fabric of the 
country and its powerful elites. While the industry involves only the shaping and stitching of the 
                                               
97 Jason Motlagh and Atish Saha, “The Ghosts of Rana Plaza: In Bangladesh, one year after the worst accident in the 
history of the garment industry, recovery remains a fragile process, justice seems elusive, and reform has a long way 
to go,” Virginia Quarterly Review 90, no. 2 (2014): 79. 
98 The Associated Press, “Bangladesh garment factory fire kills at least 10 people,” October 8, 2013, The Associated 
Press, http://www.cbc.ca/news/world/bangladesh-garment-factory-fire-kills-at-least-10-people-1.1930120. 
99 Jim Yardley, “Grim Task of Identifying Factories’ Dead Overwhelms Bangladeshi Lab,” May 30, 2013, The New 
York Times, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/31/world/asia/bangladeshi-lab-struggles-to-identify-rana-plazas-
dead.html?pagewanted=all.  
100 Anu Muhammad, “Wealth and Deprivation: Ready-made Garments Industry in Bangladesh,” Economic and 
Political Weekly 46  no. 34 (2011): 23.  
101Ibid., 24. 
Otlewski23 
 
material that comes from outside the country, the factories themselves are more durably sewn 
into the structures of privilege.”102 With the nature of the industry, “Owners and foreign buyers 
blame each other for the pressure on the workers, but their interlocking relationship ensures that 
both make enormous profit at the workers’ expense. The garment lords of Dhaka lament that 
Western brands constantly demand increases in productivity, even though their own yield from 
the labour of the people has passed any possible description of justice- they are extravagantly 
rich.”103 Seabrook describes a trip he took in the Business Class of Biman Bangladesh Airlines, 
stating that it was like being present at a cocktail party of the ruling elite.
104
 “They all knew each 
other, sharing stories and exchanging gossip about visiting their kinsfolk in London, Rome, 
Washington, California; the places where their children were studying; and the specialists whom 
their relatives had consulted. Clearly, the education and health care provision of Dhaka were not 
good enough for them. It is a restricted, claustrophobic world, which has at its disposal resources 
equal to anything the global rich can boast.”105  
“With the divide being as large as it is between those who stitch together garments and 
those who own the buildings and govern the industry it is no surprise that despite the significant 
achievement in the national economy, labour unrest in this sector is not diminishing at all.”106 
According to scholars Mohammad Yunus and Tatsufumi Yamagata, “In order to survive in the 
quota-free competitive international market, addressing labour unrest has been a crying need.”107 
Labour unrest has been common in the ready-made garment industry. “Workers are being 
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embroiled in clashes frequently; they call strikes often to press their demand home. It causes 
enormous loss to the owners, cripples the economy, and tarnishes the image of the country 
abroad. It also makes foreign buyers reluctant to render future orders. In addition, the industry is 
losing competitive edge for this.”108 
The instability created by labour unrest is added to by disasters within the industry, yet 
“the collapse of Rana Plaza neither stopped the apparently relentless expansion of the 
Bangladeshi economy nor [did it] greatly [disrupt] the international clothing trade.”109 “The 
country’s total exports - four-fifths of which are clothing - rose to $2.7 billion in June (2013), up 
sixteen per cent from the same month [in 2012], in spite of Rana Plaza and a factory fire at 
Tazreen Fashions …in which one hundred and twelve workers died.”110 According to journalist 
Victor Mallet, “In the West, Bangladesh was once a byword for misery and hunger. Its reputation 
was sealed by the famine of 1974 less than three years after the war of independence that 
separated the country from the rest of Pakistan.”111 “Almost unnoticed by the outside world, it 
has since joined the ranks of Asia’s fast-growing economies. On several measures of social 
wellbeing - such as child mortality - it has overtaken its richer neighbour India. The economy has 
been growing steadily at about six per cent a year, thanks partly to the expansion of the garment 
sector during the past two decades.”112 “Factory owners say the business could double again in 
the next few years provided the country improves its infrastructure, prevents…factory fires or 
accidents that result in mass fatalities, and avoids disruptive political violence.”113 
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“Political unrest, even factory disasters, might be seen as growing pains typical of 
emerging Asian economies. But the rising level of political violence and the sheer scale of the 
Rana Plaza tragedy have brutally exposed the weaknesses of Bangladesh to the outside 
world.”114 “The phrase commonly used to describe Bangladesh’s political disease is ‘winner 
takes all’: members of an incumbent government habitually persecute their opponents and 
engage in corruption and rent-seeking on a grand scale. Critics say this process is so pervasive in 
the current government that its popularity has collapsed and it now fears the outcome of a free 
election.”115 “Omar Hamid Chowdhury, managing director of Pyramid, a conglomerate that 
counts garment making among its businesses, says Rana Plaza collapsed ‘not because of a lack 
of adequate regulations but because of corruption and political failings.’ ‘All the systems are in 
place for preventing this kind of thing from happening- but they were not enforced,’ he says. ‘So 
I blame Rana Plaza on the corruption of the political parties.’”116  
Political Circumstances surrounding Rana Plaza  
 Bangladesh’s political climate allows for corruption to occur within the garment industry; 
factory owners are often courted by local politicians who are looking for ways to increase their 
own tax base and promote employment.
117
 “In the case of Rana Plaza the local mayor, Refayet 
Ullah, expedited planning permission for the building’s construction and apparently agreed to 
certain construction short cuts to speed the whole process.”118 According to scholar Ian Taplin, 
Ullah was known for “signing permits for new factories in the area, claiming that the booming 
industry in that area did not allow him time to seek mandatory safety clearances from municipal 
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bodies in Dhakar.”119 Taking short cuts is not atypical of other factories that were quickly 
constructed to take advantage of the export boom in garment assembly.
120
 
As many as fifty percent of parliamentarians have some financial interest in the garment 
industry.
121
  Furthermore, according to Taplin, “roughly ten percent of seats in Parliament are 
taken by factory owners [confirming] the deep political linkages in this industry between owners 
and politicians, who are often, it seems, the same persons.”122 “Politicians often prefer to turn a 
blind eye to potential problems for fear of losing what is currently an $18 billion a year export 
industry; they are concerned that too much regulation and its enforcement will raise prices and 
drive production elsewhere in Asia.”123 In order to “remain competitive, firms extended the work 
week and even with overtime pay (not always guaranteed) there remained an incessant 
downward pressure on costs from Western companies that often led to work intensification.”124  
Sohel Rana and Rana Plaza  
Sohel Rana, the thirty-five year old owner of the eight-storey building has been described 
in local Bangladeshi media as “the archetypal Bangladeshi muscleman, known locally as a 
‘mastan’, or neighbourhood heavy. His power, influence, and money came from providing 
muscle to local politicians. ‘He is known as a thug, a gangster in the area,’ Firoz Kabir, chairman 
of the Savar sub-district council, told the BBC.”125 
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“Rana grew up the second son of a land broker named Abdul Khalek, who, with profits 
from the sale of a parcel in Savar, opened a mustard-oil factory on the site where Rana Plaza was 
later built. Khalek cultivated ties with well-known film actors and politicians, a wheeler-dealer 
style that Rana would learn to emulate even more aggressively. He had a cold temperament well 
suited to the thuggery and intimidation tactics that are a mainstay of Bangladesh’s cutthroat local 
politics.”126  
“In 1996, the Awami League party, chief rivals of the BNP, came to power, and the 
president of the party’s student wing tapped Rana, just a year after [he had] dropped out of high 
school, to be his political aide. Two years later, Rana was promoted to secretary. Rana’s profile 
grew after he befriended Murad Jong, an aspiring politician who became the Awami League 
leader of Savar in 2001, due in large part to Rana’s muscle. When the Awami League took back 
the government seven years later, Jong returned the favor by unilaterally naming Rana to a 
leadership post of the Jubo League, the party’s youth front. In parliament, Jong used his clout to 
manipulate police and extort protection money from business owners, with Rana as his faithful 
enforcer.”127  
According to journalist Jason Motlagh, “The rise of the country’s ready-made garment 
industry caused land values around industrial suburbs like Savar to skyrocket. When a dispute 
between Rana’s father and his Hindu business partner erupted over the plaza site, the Rana 
family dispatched thugs to seize the property by force. The partner complained to local 
authorities, and says that Rana threatened him for doing so. The police, meanwhile, did nothing. 
Flexing his connections in the Savar mayor’s office, Rana secured a construction permit and 
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began laying the ground work for the plaza, erecting the six-story building on hastily filled-in 
swampland, using cheap materials.”128  
“At its August 2009 opening ceremony, Jong was the guest of honor. On the wall behind 
Rana’s desk, in the basement office where he poured whiskey for local cops and political players 
alike, hung a framed photograph of Jong kissing Rana’s forehead…Their relationship was 
crucial to Rana’s ability to prosper in both open and underground markets. While presiding over 
a business portfolio that included brick kilns and the sale of garment overruns, officials say Rana 
and his associates kept a hand in the drug trade.”129  
Yet Rana made the most profit from “the garment factory rentals at Rana Plaza. By 2011, 
five floors were being leased out to garment manufacturers, contributing the bulk of the plaza’s 
1.5 million euro annual rental income. Three years earlier, in March 2008, Mayor Refat Ullah 
granted Rana a permit to add additional stories to the building, without approval from the city 
development authority. By 2013, a ninth floor was in the works. When the cracks appeared, on 
April 23
rd
, Rana was dismissive…He was also unmoved when the local engineer who had been 
called in to inspect the site was shaken by the large cracks [he had] found in the building’s 
[foundation].”130  
“For days, Rana had been planning a counter protest against the BNP-ordered hartal, and 
his reputation in Savar hinged in large part on his ability to mobilize grassroots defiance. On the 
morning of April 24
th
, he was in his basement office with colleagues calling people by phone, 
haranguing them to report for work. When workers outside refused, he joined the factory owners 
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to bully them inside.”131 Rana’s basement office turned out to be one of the safest places in the 
building. Following the collapse, bodyguards called Rana’s cell phone, discovered he was 
trapped in his office, and dug him out. Three days later, he was arrested in the border town of 
Benapole, on his way into India. News of his arrest was announced during a news conference at 
the disaster site, where crowds cheered and chanted for his hanging.
132
  
Authors Andreas Wieland and Robert Handfield argue that had the collapse of Rana 
Plaza not occurred, the enterprise “would be considered a textbook case for highly efficient 
global supply chains. In today’s market, supply chains compete against supply chains, global 
brands concentrate on their core competency (marketing activities) and suppliers in Bangladesh 
offer high flexibility and cheap labour costs. This has allowed global brands to create extremely 
responsive supply chains and bring lower priced apparel to store shelves. Further, the time to 
design and deliver new garments to the market has been reduced from more than one year to just 
a few weeks.”133 Sanjiv Pandita, executive director of the Asia Monitor Resource Center, has 
called it “the ugliest race to the bottom…the financial crisis in the United States and Europe 
means that people are scared of buying expensive things.”134  
Defining consumerism and its role 
Following the collapse of Rana Plaza media discourse centered around laying blame on the 
retailers using the suppliers located in the factory and focussed on the conscience of Western 
consumers buying and wearing cheap garments from those retailers. Media specifically focused 
on the role of consumerism and ‘Fast Fashion’ within Western culture and society and deemed it 
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the responsibility of both retailers and consumers to know the conditions in which clothing is 
being manufactured and the reasons behind the inexpensive prices of garments. Along the same 
vein, “fashion experts and editors were quick to advise consumers of the necessity for ethical 
purchases.”135 “Features were published by and about fashionable people, upset, and grieved by 
this predictably unexpected event [and] new impulse was given to campaigns conducted by 
organizations dedicated to fairness and ‘clean clothes.’”136 Analyses were also done of the 
consumer lifestyle and its impact on workers in developing countries. Scholar Ian Taplin in his 
article, “Who is to blame?” determined that for the most part, “Western consumers have become 
accustomed to cheap fashion and appear unwilling to pay more for items that are untainted by 
exploitative practices.”137 His finding was supported (at least in the Canadian context) by an 
article published in the Toronto Star which stated that according to Statistics Canada, Canadians 
are spending less on clothing as a proportion of their income.
138
 Money saved by consumers 
however translates into social and environmental costs as well as costs for those producing the 
products in developing countries. As a result, the Western consumer lifestyle has both global 
environmental and social implications.  
At its most basic, ‘consumerism’ is the consumption of goods and services.  In developed 
countries consumerism shapes social aspects of society- it influences what people wear, what 
they watch, how they look, where they live, and what they want. Consumerism is ingrained 
within society; it is a way of life for the majority of Western citizens. Economist Tim Jackson 
explains that, “Modern society is organised around a particular model of how to pursue human 
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wellbeing… This model contends that increasing consumption of economic goods and services 
leads to improved wellbeing: a higher standard of living and a better quality of life across 
society. Economies are designed specifically to maintain or increase consumption growth; 
business models are predicated on maximising profits to shareholders; people are inclined to 
believe that the more disposable income they have – the more they consume – the better off they 
are.”139 The problematic result is that consumption has become regarded as a way to a happier, 
fuller life. Evidence suggests however that consumption growth may actually detract from an 
individual’s wellbeing and contribute to social and environmental issues within the developing 
countries that produce and later accept the waste generated by used products.  
There are a number of ways in which consumption growth detracts from an individual’s 
wellbeing. In order for consumption growth to occur, consumer behaviours must be sustained.  
For consumer behaviours to be sustained income growth needs to occur. Income growth requires 
an increase in work hours which in turn takes a toll on the average person. “We hear the same 
refrain all the time from people: I have no life. I get up in the morning, day care, elder care, a 
forty minute commute to work. I have to work late. I get home late. I get home at night, there’s 
laundry, bills to pay, jam something into the microwave oven, I’m exhausted, I go to sleep, I 
wake up and the routine begins all over again. This is what life has become in America …”140 
Lives are dedicated to sustaining the consumer lifestyle. Sustaining such a lifestyle however does 
not only result in an exhausting day to day life; more broadly it results in both psychological 
strains and family life consequences.  
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Possession overload is an example of one of the psychological strains and may result in 
negative family life consequences. Possession overload is the problem of dealing with too much 
stuff. Dr. Richard Swenson explains:  “‘Possession overload is the kind of problem where you 
have so many things you find your life is being taken up by maintaining and caring for things 
instead of people.’”141 Swenson continues, “‘Everything I own owns me. People feel sad and 
what do they do? They go to the mall and they shop and it makes them feel better, but only for a 
short time. There [is] an addictive quality in consumerism. But it simply doesn’t work. They 
[have] gotten all these things and they still find this emptiness, this hollowness. All they have is 
stress and exhaustion and burnout, and their relationships are vaporizing. They [are] surrounded 
by all kinds of fun toys but the meaning is gone.’”142 People feel bad about themselves so they 
attempt to fill the void by purchasing more goods, continuing the cycle.  
Perpetuating the cycle further is the ease with which consumers are able to access and 
purchase goods, specifically garments. With the introduction of the ‘fast fashion’ or the lean 
manufacturing business model, it has become increasingly easier and more inexpensive for 
consumers to access products. Simultaneously, “the growth of ‘fast fashion’ can be attributed to 
high impulse buying, an increase in sourcing from low-cost countries and a change in consumer 
attitudes, with the removal of stigma attached to buying from value retailers.”143 According to 
Taplin, “As part of changes in overall production and marketing strategies, Western firms such 
as H&M and Inditex (through their Zara line) embraced a quick response model of production 
which was designed to reduce inventory and dramatically reduce the time spent between initial 
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design of garments and their eventual arrival in retail outlets.”144 “Fast fashion companies turn 
around new styles from design to shop floor within two weeks. This successful recipe has 
allowed retailers to generate large profits selling vast quantities of low-price clothing to shoppers 
seeking something new to wear every week.”145 The model, however, puts pressure on suppliers 
to meet deadlines and cost mandates, resulting in work intensification in factories and safety 
short cuts such as those taken in Rana Plaza.
146
  
Furthermore, in contracting manufacturing to countries such as Bangladesh, Western retailers 
demanded low prices and stringent delivery schedules. In order to fulfill such demands workers’ 
wages are suppressed.
147
 Taplin explains that, “With access to a large pool of generally 
compliant, female workers, and with state support for measures that [do] little to safeguard or 
even ensure worker rights, sub-contractors [are] able to meet sourcing demands by labour 
intensification.”148 A 2001 report by the National Labour Committee in Bangladesh indicated 
that of 1.6 million apparel workers, eighty-five percent are young women between the ages of 
sixteen and twenty-five. These young women work twelve to fourteen hour days a week often 
times working mandatory twenty hour shifts.
149
 “Sewers were paid 13 to 18 cents an hour (below 
the country’s minimum wage).  Even today [in 2014], monthly entry level wages of $40 are a 
quarter of that in China hence the continued attractiveness of the country for Western 
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retailers.”150 Compliance issues such as lack of fire exits, adequate toilet facilities, and adequate 
ventilation are routinely ignored by factory owners.
151
   
As emerging economies embraced labour intensive textile and apparel manufacturing, history 
seemingly began repeating itself. Many of the exploitative practices within Western 
manufacturers that were documented during the era of industrialization began occurring in Asian 
industries.
152
 The collapse of Rana Plaza was for example, compared to the frequent accidents in 
the early mills and textile plants of Lancashire and Yorkshire in Britain.
153
 Women and children 
had their hair or clothing caught in machinery, so that their whole bodies were sucked into a 
mess of pulleys and chains, and were often severely injured or killed.  Incidents such as these 
however were dispersed and not nearly as severe in fatalities as the collapse in Bangladesh.
154
 
According to Jeremy Seabrook, “In Britain, industrial calamities were reserved for more 
dangerous occupations, especially coal mining, which was to Britain in the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth century what garments are to contemporary Bangladesh: it was the largest single 
employer of labour.”155  Coincidently, in 1913, exactly a century prior to the collapse in Savar, 
“the greatest industrial catastrophe ever known in Britain took place at the Senghenydd pit in 
South Wales.”156 An underground gas explosion killed four hundred and thirty-nine miners. The 
rock fall from the explosion prevented rescuers from reaching victims and caused recovery 
efforts to last well over a month.
157
 Parallels between the Rana Plaza collapse and the 
Senghenydd mining accident demonstrate the danger of what can and does happen when 
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production and manufacturing is moved to parts of the world where health and safety regulations 
do not yet exist or are not strictly enforced. It is important to highlight here that consumer wants 
for ‘fast fashion’ and the business model of ‘fast fashion’ itself impact and are tied to countries 
that are able to sustain consumer demands both through poor and unsafe working conditions; 
which in turn are perpetuated by consumer and retailer demand. 
Yet not only does ‘fast fashion’ perpetuate poor working conditions in Bangladeshi garment 
factories, clothing that is produced under the ‘fast fashion’ model is intended only to be worn 
less than ten times.
158
 ‘Disposable fashion’, the product of ‘fast fashion’, is having a negative 
environmental impact.  “During an interview for the BBC, fashion journalist Hilary Alexander 
argued that H&M (one of the largest fast fashion retailers) had launched disposable fashion. 
Alexander stated that some of H&M’s clothing is so cheap that a consumer could only get two or 
three wears out of it before disposing it.”159 ‘Fast fashion’ therefore not only means poor supply 
chain factory conditions for workers but also an increase in waste being sent to landfills.  
One of the ways in which operations have been justified within Bangladesh is the 
opportunities the industry and Western business has created for Bangladeshi women.  As 
discussed, “Bangladesh has both an age and gender skew in its poverty. Poverty levels in 
Bangladesh are high, but this is even more so for women who generally receive less household 
resources for their food, education, health, and clothing than men.”160 Women’s status is also 
heavily influenced by the ‘extreme patriarchal’ nature of Bangladeshi society. Outside of the 
garment industry, opportunities for women are restricted.
161
  In 2005/2006 women accounted for 
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only twenty-four percent of the total labour force in the country. With the export oriented 
garment industry increasing in size, the amount of women in the workforce has begun to 
increase.  Working in the garment industry has provided female workers with agency. It has 
offered status, autonomy, and enhanced self-respect where women often remain second class 
citizens, regardless of the Bangladeshi Constitution which states equality for both men and 
women.
162
 According to Taplin, “factory work [is] for many [female] workers multi-dimensional 
in its benefits despite the often arduous work conditions, low pay, and long hours. This is 
especially the case in rural Bangladesh where alternative employment opportunities are minimal 
and the poor work conditions are seen as a trade-off for otherwise second class citizen 
constraints.”163 Yet the motivation for employing women has been argued to be the “exploitation 
of labour: the extraction of the maximum possible labour at the minimum possible costs.”164 
Regardless of the opportunity provided to women, discrimination against women in the 
workplace is rampant, especially within garment companies. 
165
 
 In order to satiate consumer demand and business profits manufacturing is moved not 
only to countries where regulations are not enforced and worker safety is not a priority, but also 
to where working in the factories provides opportunity as well as abuse for marginalized people. 
Ultimately consumer demand and the realities of ‘fast fashion’ are all interconnected and create 
the circumstances for a disaster like the collapse of Rana Plaza. Socially and economically, 
consumerism not only harms the personal and family lives of consumers but it also harms the 
people involved in the manufacturing of these goods. Labourers experience a poor quality of life 
                                               
162 Ian Taplin, “Who is to blame? A re-examination of fast fashion after the 2013 factory disaster in Bangladesh,” 
Critical Perspectives on International Business 10 no.1/2 (2014): 76-77. 
163 Ibid. 
164 Ataur Rahman Belal and Stuart Cooper, “The absence of corporate social responsibility in Bangladesh,” Critical 
Perspectives on Accounting 22(2011): 657. 
165 Ibid. 
 
Otlewski37 
 
working in conditions that are neither physically nor psychologically safe. Globalization has 
meant that corporations can enter a country and not only dictate how people earn a living but 
under what conditions they do so. Currently corporations dictate conditions through how much 
they are willing to spend on paying for production. Cost dictates standards and vice versa. The 
lower the standards for workers, the lower the cost of production. Unfortunately the 
consequences of these circumstances have become more frequent in news headlines.   
In an interview with journalist Jason Motlagh BGMEA’s (Bangladesh Garment 
Manufacturers and Exporters Association) co-vice president argued, “‘No one wants to pay 
more… If you really care about the workers, you must have proper pricing … if buyers paid a 
little bit more, they could make sure more money was going to wages and safety improvements, 
they could check the books and talk to workers…. It [is] consumers who [need] to assume 
greater responsibility. When Rana Plaza collapsed, we saw lots of propaganda on the streets of 
London and New York. But when you’re selling three pound jeans, everybody loves it. So you 
have to come out of that mentality as a consumer. You have to stop and think: where are these 
clothes coming from and at what cost?’”166 As author Johannes Brinkmann argues however, 
“Rather than criticizing consumers (as businesses sometimes do) or laying blame on business (as 
politicians and consumer activists tend to do) it seems more productive to consider social and 
environmental risks a shared responsibility.”167  
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Corporate Social Responsibility  
Corporate Social Responsibility and Bangladesh  
According to an article in the Economist, with Bangladeshi governments of all levels 
“making rudimentary attempts to enforce the national building code, especially against 
politically well-connected landlords … the spotlight is on the multinational companies whose 
orders from local factory owners have led to the rapid recent growth of the garment industry in 
Bangladesh.”168 With a menial workforce that has been “susceptible to exploitation and with the 
garment industry’s sweatshops acting as defacto laboratories for a variety of abuses and 
endangerment for nearly a century” 169 corporations whose operations are sourced in Bangladesh 
need to take extra care in the way they do business within the country.  
Corporate social responsibility governs the way in which corporations conduct operations 
in communities and focusses on the relationship between business and society.
170
  Under the 
concept of corporate social responsibility, companies are responsible for “the social and 
environmental impact of their activities and for the well-being of their workers, including 
workers in the supply chain and other companies.”171 “Rising public concern about the social and 
environmental impacts of economic growth and increased legislation in areas of social welfare 
and environmental protection led many corporations to adopt [corporate social responsibility 
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practices] to assess the social and environmental impacts of their business activity.”172 “The 
World Business Council defines corporate social responsibility (CSR) as ‘the commitment of 
business to contribute to sustainable economic development working with employees, their 
families, the local community, and society at large to improve their quality of life.’”173 
 “The general corporate environment of Bangladesh is characterized by a concentrated 
ownership structure, a poor regulatory framework, dependence on bank financing and a lack of 
effective monitoring and its abundant labour force.”174  The ready-made garment industry is also 
“internationally prominent. In April 2011, its RMG sector exports totaled US$14 170 million.”175 
The availability of cheap labour has led to the success of this industry.
176
 Yet at the same time 
the availability of cheap labour has created circumstances that create a labour force vulnerable to 
victimization.  Author Mia Mahmudur Rahim argues that, “corporate liabilities in the recent 
turmoil in the [ready-made garment] industry explains that the governance of this industry does 
not consider the development of their workers’ livelihood as their social responsibility. Rather, 
they consider the workers as their assets and [therefore] their strategies related to their workers 
are solely based on cost-benefit analysis for quick return.”177 
 In a study conducted by Ataur Rahman Belal and Stuart Cooper, it is argued that there is 
a low level of corporate social responsibility reporting in Bangladesh.
178
 Interviews with 
participants suggest that the main reasons for non-disclosure include lack of resources, a profit 
imperative, lack of legal requirements, lack of knowledge/awareness, poor performance, and the 
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fear of bad publicity.”179 Rahman Belal and Cooper argue that “current CSR reporting practice 
has failed to enhance corporate transparency and accountability.”180 Furthermore, “empirical 
research has … shown that CSR and its reporting has traditionally focused on issues of interest to 
powerful economic stakeholders while neglecting ‘eco-justice’ issues that are of relevance to less 
powerful social stakeholders.”181 
 Eco-justice is “concerned with intragenerational and intergenerational equity.”182 This is 
the way in which resources are distributed within the current generation and between the current 
generation and future generations so that their needs are met. It is concerned with the distribution 
of wealth and decisions that affect this.
183
 Eco-justice includes issues of “equality, child labour, 
and poverty alleviation.”184  Rahman Belal and Cooper argue that, “the corporate reporting of 
such eco-justice issues could expose inequalities and hence enhance democracy, transparency, 
and accountability of organisational decision making which affects wealth distribution.”185  As a 
result, corporate social responsibility practices have the potential to address wider issues within a 
country. 
 Yet problems exist in the way CSR reporting is carried out in Bangladesh.  For example, 
interviewees in the study conducted by Rahman Belal and Cooper argued that, “their companies, 
based and operating within a developing country, [could not] afford the resources for CSR 
reporting.”186 Interviewees suggested “that CSR reporting would require companies in 
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developing countries to commit additional scarce resources in terms of both time and money.”187  
Rahman Belal and Cooper argue that these sentiments indicate that eco-justice issues are not 
prioritized by corporate elites and politicians in contrast to concerns for profit.
188
 
Weak regulation is also partly to blame in the way CSR reporting is conducted. “In 
Bangladesh neither formal nor informal regulation presently requires companies to disclose. 
Formal regulation could legally require companies operating within Bangladesh to publish CSR 
reports generally and more specifically to disclose on relevant eco-justice issues such as child 
labour, poverty alleviation, and equal opportunities.”189 Interestingly, “a number of interviewees 
indicated a concern that CSR and its reporting would be considered to be a departure from 
shareholders’ wealth maximization objective. In line with the extreme ‘business case’ for CSR it 
was argued that a company’s main objective should be to make profits with little scope for 
diverting resources to non-essential activities. ‘If I disclose on welfare activities even the small 
shareholders might ask me why you are spending our money on welfare activities. That’s why 
we don’t disclose these things through the annual report.’”190 Furthermore, “some interviewees 
argued that there are inherent problems in disclosing certain things, such as donations and 
contributions to other charitable work, because it leaves one open to more and more people 
lining up demanding donations from the company for their charity/community projects.”191 
Alongside the lack of regulations is the lack of legal requirements to disclose. “Like many other 
countries of the world CSR reporting is not a mandatory requirement in Bangladesh.”192 “A 
number of interviewees expressed the view that the main reason for not disclosing these 
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significant issues is the absence of legal requirements. The prevailing managerial attitude is: ‘we 
will only comply if we are legally bound to do so.’”193  
Corporate Social Responsibility Initiatives and Rana Plaza  
 Following the collapse of Rana Plaza two private corporate social responsibility (CSR) 
initiatives emerged in response to calls on Western and European corporations for action; they 
include the Accord on Fire and Building Safety in Bangladesh and the Bangladesh Worker 
Safety Initiative of the Alliance for Bangladesh Worker Safety.
194
  
 The Accord on Fire and Building Safety in Bangladesh was adopted on May 13
th
, 2013, 
following the collapse the previous month.  Authors Beryl Ter haar and Maarten Keune explain 
that the agreement only took three weeks to materialize because, “the Accord is a ‘renaming’ of 
an agreement signed on September 20
th
, 2012 by two [multinational corporations] (the German 
chain Tchibo and PvH/Tommy Hillfiger) with the GUF IndustriAll Global Union and four NGOs 
- Clean Clothes Campaign (CCC), International Labour Rights Forum (ILRF), Worker Rights 
Consortium (WRC), and Maquila Solidarity Network (MSN), together with several Bangladeshi 
trade unions and labour rights groups.”195 
The Accord is “a five year, legally binding commitment that subjects factories to independent 
inspections and public reports while requiring retailers to fund annual safety upgrades up to $500 
000.”196  To date, participants include “Swedish mega-retailer H&M (the largest buyer of ready- 
made garments from Bangladesh), France’s Carrefour, and Britain’s Marks and Spencer clothing 
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giant that owns the Zara chain. Prior to the collapse only two companies, American PVH Corp 
(Tommy Hilfiger and Calvin Klein), and Germany’s Tchibo had signed on.”197Alongside these 
retailers, trade unions and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have also signed the Accord. 
“On the trade union side, the signatories include two Global Union Federations (GUFs), 
IndustriALL Global Union, and UNI Global Union, as well as a number of Bangladeshi garment 
unions. In addition, the NGOs Clean Clothes Campaign, Workers’ Rights Consortium, 
International Labour Rights Forum, and Maquila Solidarity Network are witnesses to the Accord, 
while the International Labour Organization (ILO) acts as an independent chair.”198 The Ethical 
Trading Initiative backs the agreement.
199
 
  Under the terms of the Accord, “the signatories agree to establish a fire and building 
safety programme in Bangladesh within a period of five years.”200 The Accord specifically deals 
with safety in the Bangladeshi ready-made garment firms that are a part of the supply chains of 
the signatory corporations.
201
  The Accord aims to “improve fire and building safety by means of 
safety inspections. The risks highlighted in the inspections require remedies, for which funding 
will be made available by the signatory companies and others. Factory managers, workers, and 
security staff will be trained to enable them to voice concerns and to actively participate in 
activities to ensure their own safety.”202  
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American companies Walmart, Gap, J.C. Penney, Sears, and Target refused to commit to the 
Accord and on July 10
th
, 2013 announced an alternative five year plan, the Alliance for 
Bangladesh Worker Safety.
203
 “[The Alliance] parallels the Accord on Fire Safety but allows the 
retailer to opt-out of the agreement if disaster strikes. Critics labeled the effort a foot dragging 
attempt to avoid costly, long term investments, expressing doubt over whether the companies 
could legitimately police themselves.”204 Scholars Beryl Ter Haar and Maarten Keune argue that 
the Bangladesh Worker Safety Initiative of the Alliance for Bangladesh Worker Safety 
“recognizes that the individual CSR efforts of [multinational corporations] have not resulted in 
safe working conditions. Therefore a collective effort is required, to which end the Alliance is 
founded and the Initiative [was] launched.”205 The twenty corporations that joined the Alliance 
are of North-American origin. The Alliance is supported by several (mainly North-American) 
employers’ associations and by BRAC (an international NGO founded in Bangladesh).  The 
Alliance seeks cooperation with other interested parties and key stakeholders, including the 
Bangladeshi government, the [ready-made garment] Industry and its workers, and other 
international organizations.”206 “The intention is to improve, over the next five years, fire and 
building safety through the development of standards, inspections, training, and worker 
empowerment.”207  Inspection and safety training for factory management and workers are to be 
monitored by a third party and a ‘hotline’ created to enable workers to report safety concerns.208 
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“The programme is supported by a funding allocation providing access to substantial low-cost 
capital for factory improvements.”209  
 With these initiatives, the corporations involved claim to “improve their corporate social 
responsibility.  From a legal or regulatory perspective, they may be seen as cases of transnational 
private regulation (TPR), i.e., regulation by private actors replacing (inter-)governmental 
regulations or covering new areas that have not previously been regulated by either national or 
international public bodies.”210  
 CSR and TPR have become increasingly common in “the governance of transnational 
labour issues. In spite of their increasing use, however, they have received mixed reviews. 
Judgments range from ‘promising developments that truly aim to make a difference’, to ‘largely 
window-dressing to improve the reputation of companies and ease the mind of the consumers’. 
These mixed reviews reflect concerns raised by TPR initiatives with regard to their legal status, 
legitimacy, implementation, and compliance.”211 CSR initiatives are also subject to a range of 
criticisms.
212
 “From an orthodox economic perspective, they are seen as unnecessary and 
draining resources from ‘proper’ business activities. Others are sceptical about the real motives 
and impact of CSR policies and consider them to be ‘ethical marketing devices’.”213 CSR 
instruments are also regarded with scepticism because of “their voluntary nature and lack a 
transnational legal framework that could give such instruments a more formal nature and 
increase their enforceability.”214  
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 Authors Beryl Ter Haar and Maarten Keune argue that, “What stands out with regard to 
both initiatives is that they were both adopted in a rather short period of time following the 
collapse of Rana Plaza: the Accord within three weeks and the Initiative within fourteen weeks. 
This would not have been possible if the route of public regulation had been taken, that is, if 
there had been a public regulator at the transnational level.”215 Second, what distinguishes these 
initiatives from most other CSR initiatives is that “they involve a substantial number of market-
leading [multinational corporations] and cover a substantial share of the supplier factories active 
in the Bangladeshi garment industry (between 35% and 50%).”216  
 Criticisms of the initiatives exist however. For example, “workers’ rights activists have 
charged that the Alliance is less transparent than the Accord, and that its members can more 
easily walk away from any commitments they make to improve factory safety.”217 One important 
difference between the initiatives however is that “with the Accord, one hundred and ten retailers 
accepted legal liability for the conditions in Bangladesh garment factories. If a factory burned 
down or collapsed, the victims’ families could use binding legal agreements to file lawsuits in 
Canada or the U.S. against the retailers.”218 
 Human rights groups also highlight the wide divide about inspection methods. “The 
Alliance’s inspection model seems to be identical to the discredited model used by individual 
companies over the past decade that has failed to detect and eliminate hazardous conditions that 
have resulted in numerous preventable factory tragedies and the deaths of hundreds of 
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workers.”219 Both initiatives have been criticized as being “just a drop in the ocean.”220 A report 
by the Center for Business and Human Rights at the New York University Stern School of 
Business said “[the initiatives] fail to address the greatest risks of this system. Those risks are 
tied to ‘indirect sourcing’ or middlemen subcontracting garment work often to non-compliant 
plants with minimum standards for safety and workers’ rights.”221 
Compensation to victims 
Compensation to victims and the families of those killed following the collapse was directly 
tied to recovery efforts and made more difficult by non-existent employee records, the nature and 
extent of injuries, and the treatment of the dead in the days and weeks that followed. The stories 
that emerged out of the wreckage demonstrated official indifference to garment factory workers. 
A complete list of employees did not exist, while the exact number of people who worked within 
the factory was unknown.
222
 Days after the collapse, according to Jeremy Seabrook, it was 
reported that thirty-two unclaimed bodies had been buried. The unclaimed dead may have been 
so for many reasons, maybe family members lived in a remote part of the country and did not 
know where their loved one worked.
223
 Seabrook explains that, “ people change factories all the 
time because of unpaid wages, mistreatment, beatings or fines for ‘misconduct’ (which generally 
means making a mistake in stitching), harassment or sexual advances by predatory male 
overseers.”224 There is a constant turnover in these unregulated workplaces; labour is dispensable 
and infinitely replaceable. Only when an event like the collapse of Rana Plaza illuminates the 
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indifference of the system does it dawn on employers that workers are more than the sum of their 
weekly labour that they have families who struggle to survive and who depend upon the small 
sums they send home.
225
  
Recovery efforts went on for twenty days in sweltering heat following the collapse.
226
 As a 
result, by the time they were retrieved, “many bodies were so mutilated or decomposed that they 
could only be identified by their mobile phones; cheap instruments of communication that 
outlasted the fragile bodies… [Families] were advised not to look at the bodies of their dead, 
since [they] were mutilated or decayed beyond recognition.”227 The process of finding the body 
of a loved one amongst the mass of victims was grueling at first. Cases occurred where relatives 
of deceased claimed the same body: “decomposed, perhaps  unidentifiable, but relatives wanted 
to be able to say they had fulfilled their duty; and for this they needed possession of remains; to 
whom these belonged became secondary to the faithful performance of the necessary ritual.”228 
Other issues arose during and following recovery efforts as, “unclaimed bodies were… left to 
fester in the heat. City officials later admitted that a lack of oversight and a gross 
underestimation of the scale of the disaster allowed people to make off with the wrong bodies in 
the days that followed.”229 Just as families claimed the same body, others unintentionally took 
home the wrong one as the need to bury bodies in accordance with Islamic custom played a 
role.
230
 Initially, two hundred and ninety-one bodies could not be identified. Some families who 
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had mistakenly buried the wrong body later discovered that their missing relatives were alive.
231
 
As mentioned, “The lure of cash may have played a part, since authorities were doling out 20 
000 taka payments to help cover burial costs. In at least ten instances, bodies wrongfully taken 
had to be exhumed from distant villages and returned to family members.”232 Some opportunists 
took advantage of the chaos as well. Officials were sometimes reluctant to challenge someone 
who claimed a body and would hand it over along with the initial payments of 20 000 taka (about 
$250), to people who pocketed the cash and dumped the corpses nearby.
233
  
According to journalist Jason Motlagh, a man by the name of Faisal Muhid took it upon 
himself to begin the task of collecting the personal possessions of victims to help families 
identify their loved ones.
234
 Motlagh explains that, “When [Muhid] first arrived at the high- 
school grounds twelve days earlier, his anger over the Rana Plaza rescue was replaced by 
astonishment at the treatment of the dead. Though police were manning a table near the gate, 
there was no effort to maintain order among hundreds of people searching for victims’ 
bodies.”235 An elderly woman’s plea for a body to bury resonated with Muhid and he began 
cleaning the faces of bodies.
236
 “He developed a ritual to mitigate the decay: collecting anything 
that might help families with identification - keys, cell phones, papers, teeth, nose pins, and tabij 
(a kind of prayer amulet) - then sealing it all in ziplocked bags. Touching women’s bodies was 
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taboo, even more so when they were deceased. Yet Muhid knew his examinations were critical 
to bringing grieving families some closure….When a police officer walked over and denounced 
him, he asked bluntly: Who would take his place? The officer walked away…. Authorities 
verbally harassed him but never lingered, nor did they provide any supplies or monitor the 
crowds. Personal items were stolen, and the zippers of the body bags frayed from overuse, 
leaving some of the corpses exposed.”237 
In response to the collapse the Bangladeshi government “quickly announced a rise in wages 
[an unspecified amount], and said it would henceforth be possible for unions to form ‘without the 
prior permission of the owners.’”238 The government did not however address “any 
comprehensive union to which all workers might belong. Nor did the government say anything 
about whether it was time to do away with company-sponsored unions, bogus welfare 
organisations, ineffectual and self-seeking officials; or to dismiss spies and informers. There was 
no mention of foreign NGOs, ‘labour rights organisations’, or consumer groups, which, if they 
have a role at all, need to support the functioning of free trade unions in Bangladesh.”239 Author 
Jeremy Seabrook argues that, “It cannot be left to Western activists, even less to the importers 
themselves, to determine what is good for those they and their suppliers and subcontractors 
employ.”240  
A month after the collapse there were at least three hundred and one unidentified victims, the 
only way to identify them was through bone and tooth samples. Journalist Jim Yardley reported 
that “with the wreckage cleared, the slow, painstaking process of identifying bodies [became] a 
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wrenching exercise, bringing accusations of cover-ups … as many families attempted to qualify 
for government compensation. Activists accused the government and industry leaders of 
intentionally stalling promised compensation payments to survivors and families of the dead.”241  
Increasing the wait time for identification was the fact that the National Forensic DNA Profiling 
Laboratory just could not process the number of samples given to them in a short period of 
time.
242
  
While bodies were being identified, Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina announced a 
compensation package for families of approximately $12 000. As of May 2013, only one 
hundred and fifty families had received the first installment of about $1 100.
243
  Yardley reported 
that one of the reasons behind the slow distribution of compensation packages was that 
government officials were struggling to determine who the rightful claimants were.
244
 “Most 
garment workers migrated to the Dhaka region from rural villages. They often supported a 
spouse and children, and they also sent back money to help their parents…With the deaths of so 
many breadwinners, some families are desperate and fighting over the compensation. Mr. Harun 
said one woman, three months pregnant, lost her husband in the Rana Plaza collapse. She was 
given his body and his official documents, only to see his parents snatch the documents and 
make a claim for compensation.”245 
According to journalist Jason Motlagh, “After dozens of amputee victims were paid large, 
well-publicized settlements, some relatives of the confirmed dead received payments of about 
half as much, with promises of more. Hundreds of others without positive identification of 
                                               
241
 Jim Yardley, “Grim Task of Identifying Factories’ Dead Overwhelms Bangladeshi Lab,” May 30, 2013, The New 
York Times, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/31/world/asia/bangladeshi-lab-struggles-to-identify-rana-plazas-
dead.html?pagewanted=all. 
242 Ibid. 
243 Ibid. 
244 Ibid. 
245 Ibid. 
Otlewski52 
 
recovered remains received nothing. According to the Bangladesh Institute of Labour Studies, 
none of the four thousand families affected by the tragedy received the full payments promised 
by the government or the BGMEA.” 246 
Compensation from the retailers involved was also slow to come. In September 2013, five 
months following the collapse just one manufacturer, Primark, came forward to compensate 
victims.
247
 In October, Loblaw committed to long-term, direct financial compensation beginning 
in 2014.  Loblaw said it would pay three months’ wages to all employees of New Wave Style or 
their dependents. The company was following in the path of Primark, its sister chain in Britain- 
both controlled by the Weston family.
248
 Journalist Daniel Schwartz argues that, “Low wages are 
the reason the global garment industry gets clothes from Bangladesh, about $22 billion worth last 
year. But it also means a compensation program based on those low wages [will not] cost that 
much.”249 
In September 2013, “garment workers staged widespread protests demanding an increase in 
the minimum wage from $40 per month to $109. The protests forced at least four hundred 
garment factories to close temporarily, according to the International Labour Rights Forum. The 
workers’ demand [was] based on the average cost of living, which is at least $109 per month, 
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according to the Bangladesh Institute of Labour Studies. Factory owners offered a twenty percent 
increase, with the government expected to announce in October.”250  
In November of 2013, “a government-appointed panel in Bangladesh voted to raise the 
minimum wage for millions of garment workers to about $66 a month- still the lowest in the 
world and well below what workers had been seeking.  According to local research groups and 
rights activist Kalpona Akter, Bangladesh still has the lowest minimum wage in the world, even 
if the raise goes into effect. The Ministry of Labour still must approve the raise. Factory owners 
say it is difficult for them to significantly raise the minimum wage because global brands are 
unwilling to pay higher prices amid stiff competition and a protracted economic crisis in the 
West.”251  
 “In time for the first anniversary of the collapse (April 2014) compensation payments of 
$700 [were] finally being handed out to survivors and victims’ families- an amount critics say is 
woefully low. An international effort to raise $40 million from the brand name manufacturers 
that used Rana Plaza suppliers has also fallen short of its goal.  To date, only $15.3 million has 
been collected for the Rana Plaza Donors’ Trust Fund, even though there were twenty-nine 
major brands using a factory inside the building. About half of those companies have contributed 
to the trust fund. Some, like Benetton and J.C. Penney, have yet to give anything.”252 Bob 
Jeffcott of the Maquila Solidarity Network a Toronto-based labour and women rights 
organization argues, “‘It is terrible [victims] have waited this long. Some have had to pull their 
children out of school because they can no longer afford it. Others who can’t work can no longer 
                                               
250 Daniel Schwartz, “Analysis: Rana Plaza compensation would cost retailers little,” CBC News, October 25, 2013, 
http://www.cbc.ca/news/world/rana-plaza-compensation-would-cost-retailers-little-1.2224749. 
251 Huffington Post, “Bangladesh Garment Workers Get a Raise (But They Still Make Lowest Minimum Wage in 
the World),” Huffington Post Business, November 4, 2013, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/11/04/bangladesh-
minimum-wage_n_4211794.html.  
252 Tanya Talaga, “Rana Plaza survivors get first compensation payments,” The Toronto Star, April 24, 2014, 
http://www.thestar.com/news/world/2014/04/24/rana_plaza_survivors_get_first_compensation_payments.html. 
 
Otlewski54 
 
pay their rent. It is a double tragedy: first they are injured, then they are waiting for 
compensation.’”253 Companies that have donated to the fund include “Canada’s Loblaw, 
Primark, Bonmarché, El Corte Ingles, and Mango. Another $2.2 million has come via the non-
governmental organization BRAC USA, which includes donations from the Gap Foundation, the 
Children’s Place, VF Foundation, Walmart and the Walmart Foundation. Loblaw, owner of the 
fashion line Joe Fresh, has committed $5 million in local relief and compensation. That makes it 
one of the top global donors. Bob Chant, Loblaw senior vice-president of corporate affairs and 
communications, in a statement to the Toronto Star said that over the past twelve months, 
Loblaw has worked with industry, government, non-governmental organizations, and the 
International Labour Organization to improve working conditions and building safety 
standards.”254  
Non-State Actors  
According to authors Bernstein and Cashore, in order to address the absence of effective 
national and intergovernmental regulation to improve international environmental and social 
problems, ‘private’ alternatives such as self-regulation, corporate social responsibility, and 
public-private partnerships have been created.
255
 Non-state market driven (NSMD) systems are 
one of the responses to this gap in effective regulation and have been created to help solve or 
mitigate issues such as “fisheries depletion, deleterious environmental impacts from food 
production, tourism, and mining, rural and community poverty, and inhumane working 
conditions.”256  
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NSMD systems “encourage compliance by recognizing and tracking, along the market’s 
supply chain, responsibly produced goods and services.”257 The aim of NSMD systems is to 
unite companies, social actors, and stakeholders in a “community that accepts ‘shared rule as 
appropriate and justified.’”258 According to Bernstein and Cashore, non-state market driven 
systems are designed to embed social and environmental norms in the global marketplace.
259
 
Similarly Affolder states that, “financiers and insurers channel environmental norms to industry 
just as they channel funds there.”260 Non-state market driven systems therefore have the 
advantage of channeled pressure from banks, insurance companies, and shareholders; while also 
using corporate reputation as a pressure point.
261
 Initiatives to protect environmental and human 
rights can therefore be executed by non-state actors. There are, however, advantages and 
disadvantages to both compulsory regulations and voluntary initiatives. Regulations coming out 
conventions for example, may not be ratified by state actors and therefore compliance is not 
required. If ratified however, regulations require compliance and thus some degree of 
environmental and human rights protection can be achieved. Voluntary initiatives are not 
mandatory and therefore what encourages companies to join is market-based incentives; with 
enough incentive for companies environmental and human rights protection can be furthered. 
Without a market-based incentive however companies are not obligated to join an initiative.  
With reputational and financial pressures, companies may also sign onto schemes that fit 
existing company standards in order to promote themselves as being part of the cause to, for 
example, promote environmental and human rights protection. Furthermore, companies may sign 
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on to schemes to remedy their track record and show consumers, banks, and insurers an 
improvement in their operations. As a result, non-state market driven systems may not be as 
effective as regulations set by state actors at changing or improving a company’s business 
practices. Therefore state actors are necessary for environmental and human rights protection. 
Implemented together, however, steps towards protected workers’ rights can be made more 
efficiently. 
This section of this major research paper aims to look at two of the many non-state 
market driven systems that play a role in the ready-made garment industry in Bangladesh. In 
their own way each of these systems encourages change through business; interestingly of the 
retailers involved in the collapse H&M is a member of both non-state market driven systems. 
Just like the initiatives that emerged after the collapse, the initiatives under the Fair Labour 
Association and Social Accountability International are meant to protect worker rights and 
encourage safer and healthier working conditions, yet retailers that are member to these non-state 
market driven systems can not solely rely on the initiatives to safe guard their supply chains and 
their reputations, as is demonstrated by H&M. 
The Fair Labour Association (FLA)  
The Fair Labour Association (FLA) is dedicated to protecting workers’ rights and to 
improving working conditions internationally. The association combines the efforts of 
businesses, colleges, universities, and civil society organizations through adherence to 
international standards.
262
 The association originated in 2001 and was initiated by industry, the 
Clinton administration, and consumer and labour rights organizations. The FLA works 
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internationally to address the policy problem of labour conditions and workers’ rights in the 
apparel and shoe market and targets producers, namely sweatshops.
263
 
The FLA places the responsibility on companies to “voluntarily meet internationally 
recognized labour standards wherever their products are made.”264 The association does so in 
three steps. First the association “holds affiliated companies accountable for implementing 
FLA’s Code of Conduct across their supply chains.”265 The FLA’s Code of Conduct is “based on 
International Labour Organization (ILO) standards, and seeks to protect the workers who 
manufacture the clothing, footwear, luggage, jewelry, electronics, and other items enjoyed by 
consumers around the world.”266 The FLA’s standards concern employment relationships, non-
discrimination, harassment or abuse, forced labour, child labour, freedom of association and 
collective bargaining, health and safety, the environment, hours of work, and compensation.
267
 
Each standard aims at addressing and improving a worker’s experience in the factory. Secondly, 
the FLA ensures that affiliated companies protect workers’ rights through conducting external 
assessments and investigations in order to keep consumers informed. The FLA also assists in the 
resolution of complaints, ensuring transparency.
268
 Lastly, the FLA supports compliance in 
providing training and resources to help companies and factories meet standards and improve 
conditions for workers.
269
 In supporting compliance the FLA uses what they call their 
Sustainable Compliance methodology (SCI).
270
 SCI is designed “to move the field of social 
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compliance beyond policing and temporary remedies.”271 According to the FLA, “conventional 
audits do little to prevent recurring violations or drive sustainable and progressive improvements 
in working conditions. [The SCI] helps improve workers’ lives by gauging usual and normal 
working conditions rather than a snapshot on a particular day; and uncovering root causes of 
problems and providing systemic, sustainable solutions so that problems are fixed in a lasting 
way.”272 Through placing responsibility on companies to meet labour standards the FLA ensures 
improvements in the lives of workers who produce goods for companies. Some of the companies 
that have committed to the FLA’s Code of Conduct include Adidas, Apple, Fruit of the Loom, 
H&M, Nestle, Nike, Patagonia, and Puma.
273
  
Social Accountability International (SAI)  
Like the Fair Labour Association, Social Accountability International (SAI) seeks to 
promote and protect workers’ rights. The SAI is a non-governmental, multi-stakeholder 
organization and was established in 1997. 
274
 It was initiated by the Council on Economic 
Priorities and a handful of firms. The SAI aims to address the policy problem of workers’ rights 
and community involvement within the wider market range of factory products including toys 
and cosmetics, excluding extractive operations.
275
 SAI’s mission is to advance the human rights 
of workers around the world. It partners to eliminate sweatshops by “promoting ethical working 
conditions, labour rights, corporate social responsibility, and social dialogue.”276 SAI works 
through “building local capacity and developing systems of accountability through socially 
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responsible standards.”277 According to their website, the SAI “convenes stakeholders to develop 
consensus-based voluntary standards, conducts cost-benefit research, accredits auditors, provides 
training and technical assistance, and assists corporations in improving social compliance in their 
supply chains.”278  
SAI established what they call the SA8000 standard for decent work. The SA8000 is a 
tool for implementing international labour standards that is being used in over three-thousand 
factories, in over sixty countries, and in sixty-five industrial sectors.
279
 “The SA8000 standard is 
based on the conventions of the ILO, UN and national law, and spans industry and corporate 
codes to create a common language to measure social compliance.”280 The SA8000 Standard 
addresses: child labour, forced and compulsory labour, health and safety, freedom of association 
and right to collective bargaining, discrimination, disciplinary practices, working hours, 
remuneration, and management systems.
281
  
Since its founding, SAI has provided training to “over 30 000 people, including factory 
and farm managers, workers, brand compliance officers, auditors, labour inspectors, trade union 
representatives, and other worker rights advocates.”282 SAI not only engages with companies in 
promoting their voluntary compliance standards but also focusses on the broader context of 
compliance.
283
 SAI engages with trade unions, NGOs, multi-stakeholder initiatives, organic, fair 
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trade and environmental organizations, development charities, and anti-corruption groups to 
carry out research, training, and capacity building programs and to achieve socially responsible 
practices around the world.
284
  
In order to operate, the SAI receives financial support from many individuals, 
institutions, foundations, government bodies, and businesses.
285
 Some of the governments and 
multilateral institutions that support the SAI include: the German Development Cooperation 
(GIZ), the UK Department for International Development (DFID), UN Women, the US Agency 
for International Development (USAID), and the World Bank-International Finance Corporation 
(IFC).
286
 Some of the more well-known companies involved in public-private partnerships and 
collaboration and membership with the SAI include The Body Shop, Burberry, Gap Inc., H&M 
International, and Marks & Spencer. 
287
  
Future Steps and Recommendations 
The collapse of Rana Plaza drew attention to Bangladesh’s highly profitable, low-cost 
garment industry and added pressure on Western retailers to improve workplace safety in the 
Bangladeshi factories that supply them.
288
 Yet while consumers and activists demanded more 
transparency from retailers within the weeks, months, and year that followed the disaster, change 
has been slow. In order to learn from the disaster and the circumstances leading to collapse of 
Rana Plaza the final section of this major research paper provides four recommendations for 
government and corporate actors as well as consumers.  
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1. Corporations remain in business with current factories in their supply chains and work 
with government officials, factory owners, and stakeholders to improve conditions 
employing tools such as self-regulation and corporate social responsibility initiatives. 
 Less than a month after the collapse ‘fast fashion’ retailers were scrambling to find 
effective and lasting solutions to appease consumer concerns and prevent any further tarnishing 
of their reputations.
289
 Solutions ranged  and included moving business elsewhere; staying in 
Bangladesh and attempting to improve factory conditions; signing off on a cross-retailer 
agreement; and directly informing consumers with ethical labeling.
290
 Labour rights groups were 
quick to argue that leaving a factory could put the workers at risk because none of the structural 
and safety issues would be solved.
291
 Leaving would not solve the issues that allowed the 
collapse to occur; rather it would allow them to continue.  
 Directly after the collapse many Western retailers took the ‘wait-and-see’ approach.292 
Canada's Loblaw Companies Ltd., for example, “was the most vocal about its plans to stay and 
help where it could.”293 Questions surfaced however about the effectiveness of self-regulation 
and whether a single company could have much impact.  Labour rights groups questioned how 
the company would address structural issues if other retailers were not involved or contributed to 
building improvements.
294
 Following the collapse labour activists believed that “the only 
solution to the string of garment factory disasters in Bangladesh [was] to get companies to sign 
an agreement promising they [would] improve safety.”295 Groups argued that a legally binding 
agreement was the only way to ensure that companies improved conditions within their supply 
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chains.
296
 With the signing of the Accord on Fire and Building Safety in Bangladesh and the 
Bangladesh Worker Safety Initiative time will tell whether conditions in garment factories will 
see actual improvement.  
 Since the collapse, the Accord on Fire and Building Safety in Bangladesh has been 
signed by one hundred and sixty-six companies from twenty countries.
297
 “The legally binding 
agreement commits retailers to use only those manufacturers who operate safely. If a factory 
fails inspection, retailers must help fund construction upgrades.”298 Officials with the Accord are 
trying to convince others operating in Bangladesh to sign on. Meanwhile, progress is being made 
on the inspection of Accord factories.
299
 “‘About forty-five factories are being visited a week and 
so far two hundred and eighty have been inspected for fire and electrical problems while two 
hundred and forty factories have been examined for structural issues,’ said Bob Jeffcott, of 
Toronto-based Maquila Solidarity Network, a labour and women’s rights group. ‘There has been 
some resistance by manufacturers however. Some say standards are too high,’ he said, ‘[while] 
others are hesitant to shut their factories to make buildings safer.’”300  
 Another group of brands, the Alliance for Bangladesh Worker Safety, has also organized 
inspections and vowed to improve worker safety.
301
 “Working with the Bangladesh University of 
Engineering and Technology, six hundred and seventy-five inspections have been carried out to 
date, reports Harvard University’s James Gifford.”302 
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 There is however friction between the two groups of retailers. “Members of the 
Bangladesh Accord on Fire and Building Safety accuse the primarily North American retailer 
Alliance on Worker Safety of creating a similar but weaker initiative with the aim of 
confusing consumers.”303 Members of the Alliance, on the other hand, suggest “the Accord 
proponents are subverting Bangladeshi laws by publishing factory inspection reports, and 
distracting those trying to make progress from the issues at hand.”304  
 Ideally both groups should work in tandem to improve conditions along their supply 
chains and in doing so set an industry-wide standard that will prevent factory disasters from 
occurring in the future.  
2. Increase prices to better reflect the true cost of production and embrace ethical 
labeling. Bringing awareness to consumers. 
Increasing the price of currently inexpensive clothing goes against the model of ‘fast 
fashion’ yet it is one of the main ways to better reflect the true cost of production.  Increasing the 
price of clothing- industry wide in order to remain competitive- would allow for funds to ‘trickle 
down’305 the supply chain and ultimately (and ideally) raise the wages of garment factory 
workers.  
As argued, fair wages are yet another area of improvement for garment workers in 
Bangladesh. Since the collapse, monthly wages have been increased seventy-nine per cent to 
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$68.
306
 However, one of the problems is that “some Bangladesh manufacturers claim that they 
are being forced to shoulder the wage hike alone as some brands refuse to help.”307 In order for 
changes to occur both government and corporate actors need to be willing to increase wages and 
prices.    
Immediately following the collapse, other retailers began the process of becoming more 
transparent with their customers; posting information about their manufacturers. One of the ways 
to become more transparent is to embrace the practice of ethical labeling. For example, “Fair 
Trade USA, a non-profit company that audits U.S. companies and certifies whether they give 
international coffee suppliers fair wages, [moved] into the apparel sector. The pilot program 
[claimed] to be the first clothing certification with a label that shows consumers whether farmers 
growing the cotton and workers sewing the garments [are] paid adequately and [work] in an 
audited factory.”308 Demonstrating where clothing was made and by whom, would allow 
consumers to make more educated choices in their purchasing and support retailers who have 
responsible supply chains.  
3. Consumers as global citizens  
 As activist Annie Leonard argues, “change on the scale required by the severity of 
today’s planetary and social crises requires a broader vision and a plan for addressing the root 
causes of the problem. To do that we must stop thinking of ourselves primarily as consumers and 
start thinking and acting like citizens.”309 Standards are set, decisions on what to make and where 
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are decided upon in the halls of government as Annie Leonard explains, therefore as 
globalization connects all parts of the world consumers in the developed world must be 
conscious of their global role and come into their role of global citizen.
310
 Consumers must seek 
information and be aware of business practices that bring them cheap t-shirts and tank tops. With 
such awareness corporate actors may begin to change their practices.  
4. Focusing on and embracing the female work force.  
The ready-made garment industry has the potential to be a vehicle for social change 
within Bangladesh. Already the industry “offers women workers advantages not offered by the 
other limited and rather arduous avenues of employment available to women such as stone 
crushing, agricultural labour, and paid domestic work.”311 Yet at the same time there is “gender 
inequality and sexual exploitation in this industry.”312 Addressing this inequality and exploitation  
would bring about positive changes in other aspects of women’s lives such as enhancing their 
economic capabilities to spend, save, and invest their incomes, sending their children to school, 
and after meeting basic needs sending funds to their families in the countryside and therefore 
fulfilling their familial obligations.
313
 Initiatives should be directed towards specific problems 
that female workers face such as placement in jobs that require lower technical skills (therefore 
becoming trapped in low-paying jobs), stress due to long hours, few breaks, repetitive work, and 
poor working conditions, unhygienic surroundings like inadequate toilet facilities, as well as 
sexual harassment.
314
 Embracing the largely female workforce and implementing policies that 
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would create change and better working conditions for women within the industry would see 
safety improvements within the garment factories and also a shift within Bangladeshi society. 
The Year Since  
 In the year since the collapse, Bangladeshi government authorities have appointed more 
factory inspectors and plan to appoint more and argue that they also aim to ensure that no new 
factories are built without following proper safety regulations.
315
 Yet issues still remain. 
According to Human Rights Watch, the international companies that sourced garments from five 
factories operating in Rana Plaza are not contributing enough to the trust fund set up to support 
survivors and the families of those killed.
316
 The target for the fund, chaired by the International 
Labour Organization, was $40 million; only $15 million has been raised thus far. As of April 
2014, officials had started disbursing 50 000 takas ($640) as initial payments to the victims’ 
families.
317
  
Other issues rest in the structure of the country’s garment industry and have yet to be 
addressed. According to a recent study by New York University's Stern School of Business, an 
‘essential feature’ of the sector involves factories subcontracting work to other workshops that 
have even worse conditions.
318
 The report found that, “In the absence of government regulation 
the prevalence of indirect sourcing has resulted in a supply chain driven by the pursuit of lowest 
nominal costs. That means that factories receiving subcontracts are operating on razor-thin 
margins that leave concerns about safety and workers’ rights perpetually unaddressed.”319  
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According to government officials, work is being done to improve factory conditions and protect 
the industry from ‘negative propaganda’.320  
In terms of charges being laid on those who owned Rana Plaza, the investigation has 
taken a year to materialize results. As of June 2014, “Bangladesh’s Anti-Corruption Commission 
(ACC) had filed a case with local police accusing seventeen people of breaching regulations over 
the construction of Rana Plaza. The accused include the parents of Mohammad Sohel Rana (the 
man cited as the owner of the building) as well as the local mayor, engineers, and three owners 
of garment factories that used the building.”321 The accused do not include Sohel Rana. 
According to ACC spokesman Pranab Kumar Bhattachajee, “Rana’s name did not appear in 
documents covering ownership of the land and design approval, which instead listed his parents 
as owners.”322 The ACC’s investigation found that those accused had breached the building 
code.
323
 “Municipal authorities gave permission for extra floors in the building, but they had no 
such authority.”324 An official will now be appointed to conduct a further investigation which 
may result in a charge sheet being filed to a court.
325
  
Ellen Tauscher, chair of the Alliance for Bangladesh Worker Safety argues that while 
many resources are being used in the country to try to prevent another Rana Plaza, “‘It’s going to 
take a tremendous amount of co-ordination and time. There are cultural issues, there are 
competitive issues, there are dysfunctional things like the government.’”326 Tauscher also 
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explains that the situation in Bangladesh is unique. Dhaka is the only place in the world where 
nineteen-storey factories exist. Such construction makes it difficult if not impossible to get 
workers out of the building in the event of an emergency and makes it important to have fire-
suppression equipment on hand.
327
 Important to highlight as well is that “even once all the 
factories represented by the Accord and Alliance member retailers have undergone inspections, 
more than 2 500 (half of Bangladesh’s total) will not have been looked at.”328 
What is clear moving forward in Bangladesh is that it will take time and resources to 
solve the issues that perpetuate poor and unsafe working conditions. The situation within the 
Bangladeshi ready-made garment industry was created over a period of twenty years by brands 
and retailers and their local factory partners and the Bangladesh government.
329
 It is therefore 
going to take time for those actors as well as consumers and non-state market driven systems to 
make lasting improvements.  
Conclusion  
The collapse of Rana Plaza was a totalizing event. Political, economic, physical, and 
social processes and events came together over a period of decades and created the 
circumstances for the collapse. The immediate cause of the collapse was the illegal construction 
of additional floors alongside the building’s instability caused by the foundation’s placement in a 
former waterway. Cracks in the building were made worse by the heavy and vibrating machinery 
located inside and used in the manufacture of clothing. The context of the collapse highlights 
processes such as globalization which create circumstances and reasons for disasters like Rana 
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Plaza to span across the world. As scholar Harris Ali argues, “By considering the social and 
biophysical context, we can move towards a more penetrating investigation into how humans 
have created situations that endanger the community, and how human action can lessen the 
potentially disruptive effects of a disaster through appropriate and suitable means.”330 In the case 
of Rana Plaza Ian Taplin argues,  
“What emerges is a picture [of] a systemic pattern of exogenous forces 
that create conditions under which such events, if not inevitable, are at least not 
unlikely. We have individual factory owners in emerging economies pursuing 
rational self-interest and maximizing profits/minimizing costs; an institutional 
framework (international trade regulations, public policies supportive of such an 
industrial model and local government that facilitates a lax regulatory 
environment) that is both permissive and favors enterprises that provide 
employment, often regardless of actual work and safety conditions; and an 
industry structure that has rationalized supply chain management through 
outsourcing that has placed even greater pressure on cost and time. And finally, 
Western consumers have become accustomed to cheap fashion and for the most 
part appear unwilling to pay more for items that are untainted by exploitative 
practices.”331  
While the issue of poor and unsafe working conditions arguably falls onto retailers, factory 
owners, industry associations, and the Bangladesh government to monitor and improve, 
consumers are also tied to these conditions and have a role to play in their betterment.  
A Globe and Mail article, for example, which highlighted the debate about “how much 
responsibility retailers should have for the supply chain that moves products onto their 
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shelves”332 emphasized the role of not only retailers but of their customers as well. Consumers 
need to be more mindful of the global effects of consumerism and embrace their role as global 
citizens.  
Examining the collapse of Rana Plaza allows us to understand and draw attention to the 
various mechanisms that work simultaneously and result in disasters. Lessons can be learned 
from exploring disasters and ultimately be used to prevent future disasters from occurring. Rana 
Plaza highlights, like most disasters do, problems within a system. While no system is perfect, 
parts of it can be improved so that lives are not lost. 
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